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Many scientific models are representations. Building on Goodman and Elgin’s 
notion of representation-as we analyse what this claim involves by providing a 
general definition of what makes something a scientific model, and formulating a 
novel account of how they represent. We call the result the DEKI account of 
representation, which offers a complex kind of representation involving an interplay 
of, denotation, exemplification, keying up of properties, and imputation. Throughout 
we focus on material models, and we illustrate our claims with the Phillips-Newlyn 
machine. In the conclusion we suggest that, mutatis mutandis, the DEKI account can 
be carried over to other kinds of models, notably fictional and mathematical models. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
It’s 1953 and economists in the Central Bank of Guatemala are topping up the water 
tank in their recently purchased Phillips-Newlyn machine, a system of pipes and 
reservoirs with water flowing through it. The land reform act passed in Guatemala the 
previous year had redistributed unused land to local farmers. US corporation 
Wrigley’s, one of the largest buyers of Guatemalan chicle gum, had announced that it 
would stop imports from Guatemala in protest to the land reform. The economists in 
the Central Bank wanted to know what effect a decrease in these foreign purchases 
would have on the national economy. They adjusted the machine to account for the 
macroeconomic conditions that were taking hold in Guatemala and let the machine 
reach equilibrium. They then turned the valve marked ‘exports’ to the ‘closed’ 
position and watch what happened. The flow marked ‘income’ started falling, and the 
water level in a tank marked ‘surplus balances’ rose, which in turn caused a fall in a 
graph marked ‘interest rates’.2 
 
Wait. The economists turned a valve in a hydraulic machine that pumped water from 
reservoir to reservoir. How could this tell them anything about the Guatemalan 
economy? The practitioner’s reply is that the Phillip-Newlyn machine is a model that 
																																																								
1 The paper is fully collaborative and authors are listed in alphabetical order. We would like to thank 
Catherine Elgin, José Díez, Michael Poznic, Mike Stuart, Fiora Salis, and three anonymous referees for 
helpful discussions and/or comments on earlier drafts. Thanks also to the audiences in Águas de 
Lindoia, Barcelona, Bristol, Düsseldorf, Innsbruck, Manchester, Munich, San Sebastián, and Sofia for 
helpful feedback. 
2 Our discussion of the Phillips-Newlyn machine is informed by (Morgan 2012; Morgan and Boumans 
2004; Newlyn 1950; Phillips 1950; Vines 2000). There are records that the Guatemalan central Bank 
did purchase a machine (Aldana 2011; Stevenson 2011). However, central banks are notoriously 
secretive about their activities and there are no (publicly available) records of the exact uses the 
machine has been put to. Our introductory anecdote should be taken with a pinch of salt. This no 
detriment to our argument because none of the points we make about representation in general, and 
about the machine in particular, depend on what happened in Guatemala in 1953.   
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represents the Guatemalan economy, and this is why information about the economy 
can be extracted from the model. This is correct as far as it goes, but it does not go far 
enough. Per se the Phillip-Newlyn machine is just a collection of reservoirs connected 
by pipes. How does such a system become a model and in virtue of what does it 
represent the Guatemalan economy? 
 
The Phillip-Newlyn machine is not an isolated case. Plasticine sausages are used as 
models of proteins, oval shaped blocks of wood serve as models of ships, mice are 
used as models for humans, balls connected by sticks function as models for 
molecules, electrical circuits are studied as models of brain function, autonomous 
robots are used as models for insect cognition, a camera obscura is proffered as a 
model of the human eye, metal cylinders filled with hardened magma are investigated 
as models of volcanoes, a basin with pumps and hoses serves as model of the San 
Francisco Bay’s water system, and fluid ‘dumb holes’ model gravitational black 
holes.3 In all these cases (and many others that we cannot list here) a material object is 
used as a model that represents a certain target system. Our question about the Phillip-
Newlyn machine is therefore an instance of a general problem: when is a material 
object a model and in virtue of what does it represent something beyond itself?  
 
Our investigation will be aided by a precise formulation of the problem. The 
challenge is to fill the blank in ‘M is a scientific representation of T iff ___’, where M 
is a material model and T a target system.4 For reasons that will become clear soon we 
call this the Epistemic Representation Problem. The aim of this paper is to present an 
answer to this problem and to give a general definition a model. We focus on material 
models – physical objects that are used symbolically. Material models are an 
important class of models, but not all models are of this kind. We briefly discuss other 
kinds of models in Section 8 and suggest that mutatis mutandis, the account of 
representation we develop can be carried over to these. 
 
An acceptable answer to this problem will have to satisfy the following two 
conditions.5 The first is the Surrogative Reasoning Condition: models represent their 
targets in a way that allows scientist to generate hypotheses about them. Many 
investigations are carried out on models rather than on reality itself, and this is done 
with the aim of discovering features of the things models stands for. An acceptable 
theory of scientific representation has to account for how reasoning conducted on 
models can yield claims about their target systems. This condition motivates the 
choice of the term ‘epistemic representation problem’. The second is the Possibility of 
Misrepresentation Condition: an account of scientific representation has to make 
misrepresentation possible. If M does not accurately represent T, then it is a 
																																																								
3 For discussions of proteins see (de Chadarevian 2004), ships (Leggett 2013; Sterrett 2002; Sterrett 
2006), model organisms see (Ankeny and Leonelli 2011) (note, however, that classification of 
organisms as models has recently been opposed by Levy and Currie (2014)), molecules (Toon 2011), 
brain functions (Sterratt et al. 2011), insects (Webb 2001), camera obscura (Wade and Finger 2001), 
volcanoes (Spieler et al. 2004), San Francisco Bay (Weisberg 2013), and ‘dumb holes’ (Dardashti et al. 
2017). 
4  Throughout this paper we are concerned with ‘model representation’ rather than the broader 
‘scientific representation’. We leave it open whether our account applies to things like scientific 
diagrams  and images but our use of the broader term indicates our hope that it does.  
5 Different versions of these conditions have been discussed by a number of authors; see, for instance, 
Contessa (2007), Frigg (2006), Suárez (2003`) and Swoyer (1991).  
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misrepresentation and not a non-representation. Accuracy is not a part of the concept 
of representation. 
 
A variety of different positions are available, with Griceanism, similarity accounts, 
isomorphism accounts, inferentialism, and fictionalism being the most prominent 
proposals. We refer the reader to (Frigg and Nguyen 2017) for a detailed critical 
review of the sizeable literature on scientific representation. We take away from this 
review the message that none of the current accounts provides a satisfactory answer to 
our problem. Our task here is to formulate a novel account of representation that 
offers a satisfactory answer to the epistemic representation problem. To put our 
endeavour into perspective we comment on how our account compares to related 
accounts (in particular Contessa (2007), Weisberg (2012; 2013) and Giere (1988; 
1999*; 2010)), but for want of space we cannot embark on a critique of the full 
spectrum of currently available approaches here. 
 
Our constructive endeavour takes as its point of departure Nelson Goodman and 
Catherine Elgin’s notion of representation-as. Originally introduced in aesthetics 
(Goodman 1976), Elgin (2010), Hughes (1997) and van Fraassen (2008) have 
suggested that it is also the way in which models function in science. We agree. 
However, current formulations of the claim are only signposts indicating a direction 
of travel and a fully systematic account of how to use Goodman and Elgin’s tools to 
answer the epistemic representation problem has not yet been formulated. The aim of 
this paper	is to provide a nuts-and-bolts account of how representation-as works in the 
case of scientific models, thereby providing the resources to analyse how models 
function representationally in scientific practice. This requires extending existing 
accounts in a number of ways. In particular, we provide a general definition of a 
model based on the notion of an interpretation, generalise the notions of a Z-
representation and of exemplification to meet the needs of scientific modelling, and 
introduce the notion of a key, which connects exemplified properties to ones that are 
imputed to the target. 
 
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we introduce Goodman and 
Elgin’s notion of ‘representation-as’, which serves as the point of departure for our 
discussion. In Section 3 we adapt the notion of a Z-representation to the context of 
scientific modelling and offer a general definition of a model. In Section 4 the notion 
of exemplification is reconsidered in the context of scientific modelling and in 
Section 5 the notion of a key is introduced. In Section 6 we qualify the role of 
denotation in our account. In Section 7 we draw the loose ends together and formulate 
a new account of how models represent. We call this the DEKI account, indicating its 
key components: denotation, exemplification, keying up, and imputation. In Section 8 
we offer a few programmatic remarks about how this account could be carried over to 
non-material models.  
 
 
2. Representation-As 
 
Many works of art represent their subjects as thus or so. A famous caricature of 
Winston Churchill represents him as a bulldog. But this type of representation is not 
limited to caricature: Rembrandt’s Self-Portrait with Two Circles represents the artist 
as wearing a white hat, and the bronze statue of Margot Fonteyn represents the 
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ballerina as standing on her tiptoes. Goodman and Elgin term this sort of 
representational relationship representation-as (Elgin 2010; Goodman 1976, 27). In 
its general form, a representational vehicle X (e.g. a picture or statue) represents a 
target or subject Y (e.g. a politician or a ballerina) as Z (e.g. a bulldog or a ballerina 
standing on her tiptoes). Goodman and Elgin develop this notion in a string of 
publications (both joint and single authored). When referring to views shared by both 
authors, we use the acronym ‘GE’ to refer to them jointly.   
 
Talk about ‘representation’ is ambiguous between two kinds of representation. The 
caricature represents Churchill as a bulldog; at the same time it is a representation of 
Churchill. An account of representation has to individuate these notions and avoid 
equivocating on ‘representation’. To this end observe that also his passport 
photograph, the name ‘Winston’, and his nickname ‘The British Bulldog’ are all 
representations of Churchill. We add a hyphen to the words and call this relation 
representation-of. GE submit that representation-of is analysed in terms of denotation: 
X is a representation-of Y iff X denotes Y. A name is a representation-of its bearer 
because the name denotes the bearer, a picture is a representation-of its subject 
because it denotes its subject, and so on (we return to denotation in Section 6).  
 
Representation-of is distinct from representation-as. In fact representation-of is a 
necessary but insufficient condition on X representing Y as Z (Elgin 2010, 2; 
Goodman 1976, 28). It is necessary because it establishes that representational 
vehicles are about their subjects. Denotation picks out the subject and ensures that the 
vehicle points to it. The caricature represents Churchill because it denotes him. But 
denotation is insufficient for representation-as. The caricature does not just denote 
Churchill; it represents him as a bulldog, and nothing in the concept of denotation 
would help explain how the caricature does so.  
 
If denotation is a necessary condition, what are we to say about pictures that fail to 
denote? Böcklin’s Isle of the Dead represents an islet dominated by cypress trees, 
with a boatman rowing a white figure into the cove. But there is no such islet, and 
thus, there is no such islet to be denoted. Are we to deny that they are representations 
at all? GE respond by distinguishing between being a picture of a soandso, and being 
a soandso-picture. A picture showing a unicorn is a unicorn-picture but not a picture 
of a unicorn, and Böcklin’s painting is an islet-picture despite not being a 
representation-of any islet. So we have to distinguish between being a Z-
representation and being a representation-of a Z. The former is an unbreakable one-
place predicate; the latter is a two-place relation that holds between a representational 
vehicle and its subject.  
 
There is a complete disconnect between what kind of representation X is and what X 
is a representation of: the kind of X does not determine what X denotes, and the 
denotation of X does not determine its kind. Not every islet-representation denotes an 
islet (Böcklin’s), and islets can be denoted by representations that aren’t islet-
representations. Such representational practices are common in different contexts. In 
Dutch still life a snail-picture denotes humility and in Bollywood movies a two-
intertwined-roses-representation denotes the couple being intimate.  
 
What does it take to be a Z-representation? In the case of pictorial representation this 
is a much-discussed issue. So-called perceptual accounts hold that a picture X 
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portrays a Z if, under normal conditions, an observer would see a Z in X (Lopes 1996). 
GE take a different route and explain Z-representation in terms of what they call 
genres (cf. Elgin 2010, 2-3; Goodman 1976, 23). But how pictures represent need not 
occupy us here. Our problem is how scientific models work, and theories of pictorial 
representation do not carry over, at least in any straightforward manner, to the 
scientific case, irrespective of what these views are. In the next section we develop an 
account of scientific Z-representations that is independent of anything one would (or 
wouldn’t) want to say about pictures.  
 
Let us now introduce the concept of exemplification, which is crucial to 
understanding representation-as. An item exemplifies a property P if it at once 
instantiates P and refers to it. To instantiate P without referring to it is merely to 
possess P, and to refer to P without instantiating P is to represent P in a way other 
than by exemplifying it. An item that exemplifies a property is an exemplar (Elgin 
1996, 171; Goodman 1976, 53).6 Straightforward examples of exemplification are the 
sample cards supplied by commercial paint companies. These cards instantiate 
various colours, and refer to the colours instantiated (Elgin 2007, 39). 
 
Instantiation is a necessary condition for exemplification. But the converse does not 
hold: not every property that is instantiated is also exemplified. Exemplification is 
selective (Elgin 1983, 71; 2010, 6). The chip card exemplifies redness, but not 
rectangularity and being an inch long even though it instantiates these properties. 
Only selected properties are exemplified. But there is nothing in the nature of an 
object that effects that selection; no properties are intrinsically more important than 
others.  
 
In the case of the Phillip-Newlyn machine, the model exemplifies how the water 
flows through the machine, and the relative height of the liquid in its various tanks 
through time. It doesn’t exemplify being made of Perspex or being 2.5m tall. And it’s 
not just properties that are irrelevant to the workings of the machine that are not 
exemplified. In order for the water to move around the model at all, it requires a 
motor that pumps water from the floor level tank up to the top of the machine, and the 
force of gravity that draws the water downwards through the various pipes and 
reservoirs. Although these aspects of the machine are essential to its workings, they 
do not correspond to any economic feature (Morgan and Boumans 2004, 386). They 
are not selected as relevant features of the machine in the context of using it as an 
economic model, and so are not exemplified. 
  
Turning an instantiated property into an exemplified one requires an act of selection, 
which usually depends on the relevant context. The same sample card can exemplify 
rectangularity if used in geometry class. The Phillips-Newlyn machine could 
exemplify how its pump and gravity combine to generate a circular flow of liquid, if, 
for example, it was used in a plumber’s showroom to illustrate a new type of pump. 
The specifics vary from case to case, but at the level of a general theory nothing 
depends on these details. One aspect, however, is crucial: exemplars provide 
epistemic access to the properties they exemplify (Elgin 1983, 93). So to be 
																																																								
6 Throughout this paper we impose no restriction on what qualifies as a property. An item can 
exemplify one-place properties, multi-place properties (i.e. relations), and higher order, structural, 
properties. 
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exemplified a property not only has to be selected; it also has to be epistemically 
accessible. We say that property that satisfies these criteria is highlighted.  
 
These considerations can be summarised in the following definition: 
 
Exemplification: X exemplifies P in a context C iff  
(i) X instantiates P, and  
(ii) P is highlighted in C.  
P is highlighted in C iff  
(α) C selects P as a relevant property, and  
(β) P is epistemically accessible in context C.  
 
A sample cards exemplifies, say, a certain shade of red because it instantiates it and, 
in the context of paint shop, is selected as relevant and is epistemically accessible (a 
sample card too small to see with the naked eye would not exemplify red).  
 
Exemplification requires reference to a context C. A rigorous definition of a context is 
beyond the scope of this paper (indeed we doubt there is such a definition). For our 
purposes it is sufficient to think of a context as a certain set of problems and question 
that are addressed by a group of research scientists using certain methodologies while 
being committed to certain norms (and, possibly, values). These factors determine 
which of the X’s epistemically accessible properties are representationally relevant.7 
 
A key insight on the way to a definition of representation-as is that Z-representations 
can, and often do, exemplify properties associated with Zs. The Churchill caricature is 
a bulldog-picture and it exemplifies bulldog-properties like aggressiveness and 
relentlessness. The Fonteyn statue is a dancer-representation and it exemplifies the 
dancer-properties grace and being on tiptoes.  
 
Some objects do not literally instantiate the properties they exemplify. A caricature 
does not literally instantiate relentlessness (it’s piece of paper) and a statue cannot 
stand on tiptoes (it’s a piece of metal). GE acknowledge this and say that these are 
examples of metaphorical exemplification (Elgin 1983, 81). A painting can literally 
instantiate the property of being grey; it can metaphorically instantiate sadness 
(Goodman 1976, 50-52). Metaphorically instantiated properties can be exemplified in 
the same way in which literally instantiated properties are: by being highlighted. In 
the next section we replace metaphorical instantiation by the notion of instantiation 
under an interpretation, which is better suited to analyse scientific models.  
 
But for X to represent Y as Z it is not enough for X to denote Y and also be a Z-
representation exemplifying certain Z-properties. To represent Churchill as a bulldog 
it is not sufficient that the caricature denotes Churchill and is a bulldog-representation 
exemplifying certain bulldog properties. On top of that it has to impute these 
properties to Churchill (Elgin 2010, 10). Thus we arrive at the following definition of 
representation-as:  
 
Representation-As (RA): X represents its subject Y as Z iff: 
																																																								
7 Proponents of the similarity view of representation rely on an analogous notion of context to 
determine which properties are relevant for similarity comparisons between models and their targets. 
See Weisberg (2013, 149) for a discussion. 
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(i)  X denotes Y. 
(ii)  X is a Z-representation and exemplifies Z-properties P1, …, Pn . 
(iii)  P1, …, Pn  are imputed to Y.  
 
Scientific models and pictures both represent their targets as being thus or so. Indeed 
pictures and statues meet the conditions of adequacy on scientific representation 
provided earlier: they can be used to reason about their subjects and they can 
misrepresent them. This observation suggests that RA would double as an account of 
scientific representation if we take X to be a model, Y a target system and Z a 
specification of what kind of model X is. Analysing the Phillips-Newlyn machine in 
these terms yields: (i) The machine denotes the Guatemala economy (ii) it is an 
economy-representation exemplifying properties like a decrease in exports leading to 
a decrease in income (P1) and interest rates (P2 ); and (iii) P1 and P2 are imputed to 
the Guatemalan economy. 
 
This is a good start. But each of the three conditions stands in need of either 
articulation or revision (or both) in order to operate successfully in the context of 
scientific modelling. We now discuss how the conditions have to be overhauled to 
meet the needs of scientific modelling. In Section 7 we pull the threads together and 
formulate what we call the DEKI account of representation. 
 
 
3. Z-Representations and Scientific Models  
 
It is a crucial element of RA that the Phillips-Newlyn machine is an economy-
representation. But in the scientific context it is by no means clear how we can 
categorise objects as Z-representations. Unlike in the case of photographs or 
paintings, an appeal to what objects look like under normal conditions is a non-starter, 
and reference to genres at the very least requires unpacking. Reservoirs and pipes, 
plasticine sausages, blocks of wood, mice, balls and sticks, electric circuits, robots, 
the camera obscura, and metal cylinders are not in any obvious way classified as 
belonging to a particular genre of representations, and most objects of this kind don’t 
function symbolically at all. In the context of material models an alternative approach 
to understanding Z-representation is needed. 
 
We call the material substratum of model the ‘base’ O. The base of the Phillips-
Newlyn model is the system of pipes they built.8 We now use the letter ‘O’ rather than 
‘X’ to emphasise that we are dealing with a material object, and we refer to properties 
of O as O-properties. The question then is: what turns O into a Z-representation. An 
appeal to O’s intrinsic features does not help. There is nothing in water pipes or 
electric circuits that makes them economy-representations or brain-representations, 
and the mouse-object running through the kitchen isn’t a representation at all. In fact 
O’s intrinsic characteristics do not regulate how the object functions symbolically. 
One might say that someone using O as such is what turns it into a Z-representation. 
There is a grain of truth in this, but it merely pushes the question one step back: what 
does it take to use an O-object as a Z-representation?  
 
																																																								
8 Other terms used in the literature to denote O are ‘vehicle’, ‘model system’, ‘source’ and ‘model 
object’.  
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To answer this question it is illustrative to see how Phillips describes (a precursor to) 
his machine when introducing it to the wider economics community: 
  
‘the production flow of a commodity is represented by the flow of water into a tank. This flow 
is controlled by a valve […] The production flow goes into the tank containing stocks, from 
which is drawn the consumption flow, controlled and measured by a second valve similar to 
the first … Price is assumed to be determined at any instant by the quantity of stocks, 
represented by the quantity of liquid in the tank, and the demand schedule for them, 
represented by the capacity of the tank at different levels’. (1950, 284) 
 
And then later in the paper, when describing how, given the dimensions of the tanks 
and valves, scales for relevant quantities are constructed, he describes the relationship 
between O-properties and Z-properties as follows: 
 
‘Assume that the price scale is so chosen that the required relation between stocks and price of 
a commodity is reproduced on the model when one cubic inch of water is made equivalent to 
one hundred tons of the commodity.’. (1950, 285, emphasis added) 
 
So Phillips turns a pipe system in an economy-representation by taking properties of 
the machine to ‘represent’, or be ‘equivalent to’ economic properties. In other words, 
he turns the pipe system into an economy-representation by interpreting certain 
selected O-properties as Z-properties. Morgan and Boumans (2004, 383) specify the 
physical properties of the machine that Phillips interpreted as economic elements. For 
example, the flow of water is interpreted as production flow of a commodity; the 
capacity of tanks is interpreted as the quantity of stocks; and so on.	 
 
‘Interpretation’ is flexible term that can mean different things to different people. It is 
therefore important to give an exact definition of what we mean by interpretation in 
the current context. Let  O ={O1,...,On}  and  Z ={Z1,...,Zn}  be sets of relevant O-
properties and Z-properties respectively. One could then define an interpretation is a 
bijective function  I :O→Z . While correct in principle, this definition is not easy to 
handle in practice because it does not explicitly distinguish between quantitative and 
qualitative properties.9 Properties like ‘being a reservoir’ are qualitative properties: 
they are all-or-nothing properties in that they either are or aren’t instantiated. By 
contrast, properties like ‘the flow of water is x litres per minute’ are quantitative 
properties. In that case we need to distinguish carefully between the property and its 
values. To make this distinction explicit we refer to the property as the variable and to 
a specific quantity as the value. We denote the former by upper-case letters and the 
latter by lower-case letters. We furthermore adopt the convention that the members of 
 O , and  Z , are either qualitative properties or variables. So O1  could be ‘the flow of 
water through the second valve’, and o1  2.1 litres. This suggests the following 
definition of an interpretation:  
 
O-Z-Interpretation: Let  O ={O1,...,On}  and  Z ={Z1,...,Zn}  be sets of O-
properties and Z-properties respectively, whereby all members of either set are 
qualitative properties or variables. An O-Z-interpretation is a bijection
 I :O→Z ,  Zi = I(Oi ) , for i = 1,...,n  so that: 
																																																								
9 A more detailed study of both kinds of properties would be a worthwhile enterprise, but for our 
purposes an intuitive characterisation is sufficient. See Eddon (2013) for a discussion of quantitative 
properties (sometimes called ‘quantities’). 
	 9 
(i) Properties are mapped on to properties of the same kind (that is, 
qualitative properties are mapped onto qualitative properties and 
variables onto variables). 
(ii) For every variable  Oi ∈O , and I(Oi ) = Zi , there is a function 
fi :oi→ zi  associating a value of Zi  with a value of Oi .  
 
In specific cases one may want to impose further restrictions on allowable functions. 
In case of the Phillips-Newlyn machine the function associating water flow with 
commodity flow is assumed to be linear. However, such restrictions are idiosyncratic 
to the context and should not be built into a general definition.  
 
We are now in position to define a Z-representation.  
 
Z-representation: A Z-representation is a pair O, I  where O  is an object and 
 I  is an O-Z-interpretation.  
 
Colloquially one can call an O a Z-representation and as long as it is understood that 
there is an interpretation in the background no harm is done. It is important, however, 
that in a final analysis a Z-representation is a pair O, I . What kind of representation 
O is crucially depends on I, and different interpretations produce to different 
representations. One could, for instance, interpret the reservoirs as schools and 
universities and the flow of water as the movement of students through the system. 
Under that interpretation the same machine would be an education-system-
representation.  
 
A model, then, is simply a Z-representation such that O is chosen, in a certain context, 
to be used as a base.10 
 
Model: A model M is a Z-representation:M = O, I , where O  is an object 
that is used as a base in a certain context.  
 
An immediate consequence of this definition is that models need not have a target. 
Far from being an unwelcome eccentricity, this is an advantage of our account. It 
provides a natural answer to how models without targets represent: they are Z-
representations that are not also representations-of a target. The Phillips-Newlyn 
machine would be an economy-representation even if it had never been used as a 
representation of an actual economy (Guatemalan or otherwise) just as an 
architectural model of Gaudi’s Hotel Attraction is Hotel-Attraction-representation 
even though the hotel has never been built. In fact, Phillips and Newlyn’s own 
motivations for building the machine were not necessarily to represent any particular 
economy per se. Rather charmingly, Phillips describes building the machine in order 
to help ‘students of economics who, like [himself], are not expert mathematicians’ 
(Phillips 1950, 283) understand the mathematical equations that were increasingly 
being used in macroeconomics at the time.11 But of course nothing prevented the 
																																																								
10 This idea is similar to Danto’s characterisation of an artwork as an interpreted object; see Frigg 
(2013) 
11 For a full statement of the equations governing the machine see Newlyn (1950), who also specifies 
how the machine captures economic reasoning (e.g. IS-LM curves to determine changes in interest 
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machine then being used to represent a particular economy (in the same way that the 
mathematical model could have been used). 
 
Sometimes the base is a ready-made. Worms, mice, and electric circuits predate their 
use as models. Other times the base is tailor-made for the situation, as is the case of 
the Phillips-Newlyn machine. The choice of a base is a creative act. It may be 
informed by the interpretation that one would like to impose on an object, but it is in 
no way determined by it. In principle any O can be any model.12  
 
Bases can be chosen freely and our notion of interpretation imposes no restrictions on 
the choice of either O-properties or Z-properties. Did we open the floodgates to 
arbitrariness? No. Modellers will chose a base that exhibits interesting behaviour. 
Hughes rightly observes that (what we call) the base is a ‘secondary object that has, 
so to speak, a life of its own’ and which has ‘an internal dynamic whose effects we 
can examine’ (1997, 331). The Phillips-Newlyn machine is a case in point. It has a 
highly complex behaviour that economists study. Even though they could have built 
the machine differently, or they could have chosen to study another object altogether, 
once the choice is made, what they see is far from arbitrary. Likewise for 
interpretations. While one is initially free to choose O-properties and Z-properties 
freely, once a choice is made, representational content is constrained. If there are 
three litres of water in the tank and the interpretation says that the tank holds foreign-
owned balances and one litre of water corresponds to a trillion pounds, then the model 
says that there are three trillion pounds held outside of the UK. Free choices, once 
made, are highly constraining. This is why models are useful epistemically. Scientists 
study this constrained behaviour and thereby gain insight into about their subject 
matter.  
 
A few observations about Z-representations are in order. First, Z can be a concept, a 
notion, an idea, or a phantasy – anything that can belong to a certain domain of 
discourse. The important point is Z need not be properties of a target system. Indeed Z 
need not be realistic at all. A drawing can be minotaur-representation, a movie can be 
a Darth-Vader-Representation, and a model can be a perpetual-motion-machine-
representation or a superluminal-beam-travel-representation, yet none of these exist. 
There are no limits to choice of Z; anything that makes sense in certain context is in 
principle acceptable. This frees Z-representations from the dictate of targets. In this 
our account differs from Contessa’s (2007, 58), who uses the term ‘interpretation’ to 
describe a one-to-one association of the relevant objects, relations, and functions, 
found in models and their targets, as well as Weisberg’s (2013, 39-40), who 
introduces the notion of a ‘construal’ which includes an ‘assignment’ (denotation 
relations between a model and its target) and ‘intended scope’ (which specify which 
aspects of models are intended to be taken seriously in terms of their targets) to 
capture an idea similar to Contessa’s.  
 
																																																																																																																																																														
rates), and how it compares to the theories of the likes of Keynes, Hicks, and Robertson. We note here 
that the fact that the machine is describable by the same equations as macroeconomists (at the time) 
took to describe economies makes the machine what Guala (2002) calls a ‘simulation’.  
12 This observation is closely related to the often-made point that anything can be a model of anything 
else (Callender and Cohen 2006, 73; Frigg 2010, 99; Giere 2010, 269; Suárez 2004, 773; Swoyer 1991,  
452; Teller 2001, 397). The point reappears in our account if we add to a model the further conditions 
(in Section 7) to turn it into a representation of target, which is always possible.   
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Second, our definition does not require that all of O’s properties are collected in  O ; 
neither does it require that  Z  contains a complete list of Z-properties. All that is 
required is that there is at least one property in each set.  
 
Third, interpretations aren’t set in stone. In different contexts the properties that 
feature in  O  and  Z  (and the interpretation function itself) may change, and existing 
interpretations can be extended. The Phillips-Newlyn machine often leaked water 
onto the floor when it was run. Originally this was seen as technical problem with the 
machine. However, at some point economists realised that was actually an interesting 
feature and interpreted it as the flow of money from the regular economy into the 
black economy (Morgan and Boumans 2004, 397 fn. 14).  
 
 
4. Exemplification Revisited 
 
In Section 2 we have seen that an item exemplifies a property P iff it at once 
instantiates P and is highlighted in the context under consideration. What we are 
steering at is an account in which a modelM = O, I  exemplifies certain properties. 
But M does not seem to accommodate exemplification: the instantiation condition is 
mostly unattainable, while highlighting seems mostly trivial. This situation needs to 
be rectified. 
 
Let us begin with instantiation. The problem is that if O ≠  Z, then the model base O 
does not instantiate properties associated with Z, and thus cannot exemplify them.13 
The Phillips-Newlyn machine instantiates water flows but not commodity flows, and 
so it can never exemplify the latter. This unfortunate conclusion can be avoided by 
noting that nothing that is important about exemplification makes it necessary that an 
item literally instantiates P.  
 
An interpretation establishes a one-to-one correspondence between O-properties and 
Z-properties and so we can introduce the concept of instantiation-under-
interpretation-I (I-instantiation for short): 
 
I-instantiation: Let O be an object and I an O-Z-interpretation. A model 
M = O, I , I-instantiates a Z-property P iff O instantiates an O-property P’ 
which satisfies the following condition: P’ is mapped onto P under I, and if P 
and P’ are variables then I contains a function f such that p = f(p’). 
 
The idea that models can exemplify properties that they I-instantiate raises an 
interesting question about the truth conditions of claims like ‘the Phillips-Newlyn 
machine exemplifies a falling interest rate after a decline in exports’. Since the model, 
as a hydraulic machine, only I-instantiates this economic property it appears that it 
																																																								
13 We are not suggesting that this is the case in all instances of modeling with material objects. There 
are various instances where the properties exemplified by a physical model are properties they literally 
instantiate. The helical shape of a DNA model or the Froude number of the San Francisco Bay model 
are cases in point. But in order for our account to be fully general and to apply to cases like the 
Phillips-Newlyn machine, it is important that the account makes room for models to exemplify 
properties that are not literally instantiated. The cases of literal instantiation are then handled by 
noticing that there’s nothing preventing the interpretation acting as the identity on a property.   
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cannot be strictly speaking true that it exemplifies it. One way to deal with this would 
be to appeal to something like Sainsbury’s idea of truth relative to a presupposition 
(2010, 143-151; 2011). Even through it is, again strictly speaking, false that the model 
exemplifies this property, it is true-relative-to-the-interpretation in the same way that 
it is true relative to a presupposition that Holmes lives at 221b Baker Street. 
Alternatively, one might appeal to Walton’s (1990) notion of pretense. In a game of 
make believe with the interpretation as a principle of generation we are prescribed to 
imagine that the model has the economic property, in the same way that we are 
prescribed to imagine that a detective lives at such an address. Both of these options 
provide us with a notion of truth relative to an interpretation that captures conditions 
under which sentences like ‘the Phillips-Newlyn machine exemplifies a falling 
interest rate after a decline in exports’ are correct. 
 
For our purposes it doesn’t matter how this issue is resolved, so we don’t commit to a 
particular approach. It is sufficient to liberalise the definition of exemplification to 
allow objects that I-instantiate P to exemplify P (simply by replacing instantiation by 
I-instantiation). We can now say that the Phillips-Newlyn machine I-instantiates 
commodity flows, and it exemplifies particular flows if the particular flow is 
highlighted.  
 
The worry with instantiation was that it was too hard to come by; the opposite 
problem seems to beset highlighting. The concern is that all of the properties in Z  
have been selected as relevant, and thus all are exemplified. But this would trivialise 
the notion of exemplification. Fortunately this objection is based on a 
misapprehension of the workings of an interpretation. An object can exemplify only 
properties that are covered by an interpretation, but this does not imply that every 
property covered by an interpretation is ipso facto exemplified. This is because 
interpretations can, and often do, cover O-properties we are unaware of or 
uninterested in. There is a small white plastic pipe in the lower right corner of the 
machine. The flow of water through it is invisible and we haven’t paid any attention 
to it. This flow is covered by the interpretation, but it is not highlighted and therefore 
not exemplified. Or consider again the case of the Guatemalan economists. They may 
be been particularly interested in the change in the equilibrium values once the 
appropriate change had been made to the valve marked ‘foreign exports’. This means 
that the machine would exemplify this property. But in other contexts, this property 
might not be exemplified at all. For example, when explaining the working of the 
machine, Phillips himself ignores the impact of foreign imports and exports until the 
end of his paper (1950, Sec. III), which means that, although I-instantiated, the 
relevant Z-properties would not be highlighted, and thereby would not be exemplified 
even though they have been covered by the interpretation all along.  
 
Whether or not a Z-property covered by the interpretation is exemplified depends on 
whether we have epistemic access to the corresponding O-property and on whether 
the context selects that O-property as a focal point of the investigation. The adoption 
of an interpretation in no way determines that this has to be the case. O, together with 
the interpretation, provides a ‘menu’ of Z-properties that the model I-instantiates. 
Whether or not any of these properties is exemplified depends on the epistemic 
purposes of those using the Z-representation.  
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5. Imputation and Keys 
 
So far we have focused on discussing what turns an object into a Z-representation. 
And GE’s observation that Z-representations do not have to represent any Z remains 
true in the context of scientific representation. Yet at least some models do represent 
particular targets. Our initial definition of representation-as states two conditions for 
this to happen: the model has to denote a target T and it has to exemplify properties 
that are imputed to T (we write ‘T’ rather than ‘Y’ from now on to make notation more 
mnemonic). We discuss the latter condition in this section and briefly turn to the 
former in the next. 
 
Imputation can be analysed in terms of property ascription. The model user may 
simply ascribe to the target system the properties exemplified by the model, and this 
is what establishes that the model represents the target as having those properties. In 
this way models allow for surrogative reasoning: imputing a property to a target 
generates a hypothesis: T has that property. And notice that nothing in our discussion 
requires that these hypotheses are true; the result of the imputation can be right or 
wrong, thereby allowing models to misrepresent their targets.   
 
However, in many cases of representation-as the properties exemplified by a Z-
representation aren’t transferred to a target unaltered.  In her discussion of imputation 
Elgin posits that a representation imputes the exemplified properties ‘or related ones’ 
to Y (2010, 10). This observation is particularly pertinent in scientific contexts. The 
properties of a model are rarely, if ever, taken to hold directly in their target systems 
and so the properties imputed to targets may diverge significantly from the properties 
exemplified in the model. 
 
The problem with invoking ‘related’ properties is not its correctness, but its lack of 
specificity. Any property can be related to any other property in some way or another, 
and as long as nothing is said about what this way is, it remains unclear what 
properties are ascribed to T. So what connects the properties exemplified by a Z-
representation with those that are imputed to the target system? There is no universal 
answer. In some cases the connection could be described as ‘de-idealisation’. In the 
Phillips-Newlyn machine – which was known to have a margin of error – the 
connection was to move from exact properties  (like the interest rate being x) to 
intervals around those properties (like the interest rate being x ±  4% of x); or the 
property imputed could be even less specific, like an imputed positive correlation 
between foreign investment and interest rates, without any specific value specifying 
the correlation.   
 
One could put faith into context as determining what properties are imputed to the 
target. We’d rather not. It remains unclear what a model says about its target as long 
as the relation between the properties exemplified by the model and the properties 
imputed to the target is unspecified. We therefore prefer to write this explicitly into 
the definition of representation-as. Let P1, …, Pn be the Z-properties exemplified by 
the model, and let Q1, …, Qm be the ‘related’ properties that the model imputes to T (n 
and m can but need not be equal). Then the representation must come with a key K 
specifying how the P1, …, Pn are converted into Q1, …, Qm: 
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Key K: Let M = O, I  be a model and let P1, ...,Pn  be Z-properties 
exemplified by M . A key K  associates with the set {P1, ..., Pn}  a set 
{Q1, ...,Qm} of Z-properties that are candidates for imputation on the target 
system. We then write K({P1, ..., Pn}) = {Q1, ...,Qm} . 
 
The third clause in the definition of representation-as then becomes: X exemplifies 
P1, ..., Pn  and imputes some of the properties Q1, ...,Qm to T where the two sets of 
properties are connected to each other by a key K.  
 
The idea of a key comes from maps, which are paradigmatic for understanding 
scientific representation (Frigg 2010). Consider a map of the world. It exemplifies a 
distance of 29cm between the two points labelled ‘Paris’ and ‘New York’. The map 
comes with a key, which includes a scale, 1:20,000,000 say, and this allows us to 
translate a property exemplified by the map into a property of the world, that New 
York and Paris are 5800km apart. Or consider the case of a scale model of a ship 
being used to represent the forces an actual ship faces when at sea.  The exemplified 
property in this instance is the resistance the model ship faces when dragged through 
a water tank. But this doesn’t translate into the resistance faced by the actual ship in a 
straightforward manner. The relation between the resistance of the model and the 
resistance of the real ship stand in a complicated non-linear relationship because 
smaller objects encounter disproportionate effects due to the viscosity of the fluid. 
The exact form of the key is often highly non-trivial and emerges as the result of a 
thoroughgoing study of the situation.14 Determining how to move from properties 
exemplified by models to properties of their target systems can be a significant task, 
and should not go unrecognized in an account of scientific representation.  
 
K is a blank to be filled. The key associated with a model depends on a myriad of 
factors: the scientific discipline, the context, the aims and purposes for which the 
model is used, the theoretical backdrop against which X operates, etc. Building K into 
the definition of representation-as does not prejudge the nature of K, much less single 
out a particular key as the correct one. In some instances the key might be identity: 
the properties exemplified by the model are imputed unchanged to the target. In other 
cases the relation between the properties of the model and those imputed to the target 
may be similarity (e.g. (Frigg 2010, 131-132; Giere 2004). In others, the key might 
take the form of an ‘ideal limit key’ (cf. {Laymon, 1990 #1042). But keys might also 
associate exemplified properties with entirely different properties to be imputed to the 
target (for example, colours with tube lines as is the case in the London Underground 
map). The requirement is merely there must be some key for something to qualify as a 
representation-as.  
 
The above examples also show that introducing keys does not amount to smuggling in 
a mimetic conception of representation via the back door. On the contrary, keys can 
be as highly conventional. This sharply distinguishes our account from accounts like 
Giere’s (2004; 2010) and Weisberg’s (2012; 2013) who take similarity (or at least 
purported similarity), in the relevant respects to the appropriate degrees, to be the 
relevant relation between models and their targets. As discussed above although keys 
can be the identify map, or a mapping between similar properties, this is not built into 
																																																								
14 See Sterrett (2006) for a discussion of scaling relations.  
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the account, and in this sense our account is more general that those based on the 
notion of similarity.15 
 
 
6. A Remark Concerning Denotation 
 
Our first condition on models representing their targets is that they denote them. 
Denotation is difficult and much discussed concept. What establishes that a model 
denotes a target is a question we cannot resolve in this paper, and which remains an 
interesting problem for further research. Our aim here is to merely put in place a few 
sign-posts, indicating promising avenues and issuing warnings about blind alleys.  
 
Sometimes denotation is restricted to language, but this restriction is neither necessary 
nor useful because there is nothing intrinsically language-centric about denotation; 
pictures denote their subjects and models denote their targets. Likewise sometimes 
denotation is restricted to symbols denoting singular objects. Again, there is no need 
to hamstring ourselves in this way. Just as a proper name denotes its bearer, a 
predicate can denote either all elements in its extension or a universal (depending on 
ones’ metaphysics of properties). As consequence no category mistake is committed 
if we say that a model denotes, and that at least some models denote classes of objects 
rather than one singular object (a CH4-model, for instance, denotes all methane 
molecules).  
 
That a model as a whole denotes a target as a whole does not preclude there being 
additional denotation relationships between parts of the model and parts of the target. 
The Phillips-Newlyn machine as a whole denotes the Guatemalan economy, and parts 
of it – for instance the reservoir labelled foreign owned balances and the flow labelled 
income – denote parts of the economy.  
 
What establishes denotation is a vexing question.16 In the philosophy of language 
there are two broad families of approaches. According to the descriptivist approach 
(which goes back to Frege and Russell) names function as disguised definite 
descriptions, and as such denote whatever satisfies them. According to the so-called 
direct reference approach (which goes back to Mill, Marcus and Kripke), names 
directly pick out their bearers without going via any descriptive content. Both of these 
are in principle compatible with our view of scientific models and for now we want to 
remain agnostic about this choice. We also have pluralist leanings and want to make 
room for there being different ways to establish denotation in different cases and in 
different contexts. In many cases denotation is borrowed from language. In map of 
New York we see a black dot with ‘Grand Central Terminal’ written next to it, and so 
the dot borrows denotation from language. Many models seem to work in the same 
way. The Phillips-Newlyn machine denotes whatever the word ‘Guatemalan 
economy’ denotes. At least in cases where this happens, this is to hand over the 
problem of uncovering the roots of denotation to the philosophy of language.  
 
 
7. The DEKI Account of Representation 
																																																								
15 For extensive criticisms of the similarity account see (Frigg 2006; Frigg and Nguyen 2017; Suárez 
2003). 
16 For discussions and surveys see (Lycan 2000, Chapters 4,5; Reimer and Michaelson 2014).  
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We can now tie the loose ends together and fill the blank in the epistemic 
representation problem: ‘M is a scientific representation of T iff M is Z-representation 
that represents T as Z’. In a bit more detail this amounts to the following: 
 
DEKI: LetM = O, I  be a model, where O is used by a scientist as the base of 
the model and I  is an O-Z-Interpretation. Let T be the target system. M 
represents T as Z iff all of the following conditions are satisfied: 
(i) M denotes T (and in some cases parts of M denote parts of T). 
(ii) M exemplifies Z-properties P1, ...,Pn . 
(iii) M comes with key K associating the set {P1, ..., Pn}  with a set of 
properties{Q1, ...,Qm} : K({P1, ..., Pn}) = {Q1, ...,Qm}  
(iv) M imputes at least one of the properties Q1, ...,Qm to T.  
M is a scientific representation of T iff M represents T as Z as defined in (i)-(iv).  
 
We call this the DEKI account of representation to highlight its key features: 
denotation, exemplification, keying-up and imputation. Figure 1 provides a schematic 
representation of the account. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 – The DEKI account of representation. 
 
 
We can now present a complete analysis of how the model that has guided us through 
this paper works. The Phillips-Newlyn machine (O) is used as the base of a model by 
Guatemalan economists. Z is an economy. The machine is endowed with Phillips’ O-
Z-interpretation (I), mapping O-properties onto Z-properties. The machine so 
interpreted is an economy-representation, and as such it is a model M (an economy-
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model). The Guatemalan economists used M as a model-of the Guatemalan economy 
by making it denote the Guatemalan economy (i). They did so by borrowing the 
reference of the linguistic expression ‘Guatemalan economy’ and the model denotes 
whatever the term denotes. The machine instantiates a number of water-pipe-
properties and, via I, it I-instantiates a number of economy properties. Some of them – 
the effect that a decrease in foreign exports had on income and the interest rate for 
instance – are exemplified because they were highlighted (ii). We can presume that 
the economists used an interval-valued key, which moved from specific changes in 
value for the interest rate before and after the change in foreign exports to values ±  
4% around them (iii) and imputed the result to the Guatemalan economy (iv).  
 
This, we claim, is the right analysis not only of how the Phillips-Newlyn machine 
works symbolically; it is also the right analysis for all other material models. The use 
of plasticine sausages as models of myoglobin, of mice as models for humans, etc. all 
can be analysed in terms of DEKI.  
 
A number of qualifications are in order. First, {P1, ..., Pn}  need not be a list of 
independent, or even monadic, properties. In fact the set can be highly structured with 
some Ps expressing relationships between other Ps.  
 
Second, DEKI is the general form of an account of representation and as such it needs 
to be concretised in every particular instance of representation. In every concrete case 
of a model representing a target one has to specify what O is, how it is interpreted, 
what sort of Z-representation it is and what properties it exemplifies, how denotation 
is established, what translation key is used, and how the imputation is taking place. 
Depending on what kind of representation we are dealing with, these ‘blanks’ will be 
filled differently. But far from being a defect, this degree of abstractness is an 
advantage. Scientific modelling is an umbrella term covering a vast array of different 
activities in different fields, and a view that sees representations in fields as diverse as 
macroeconomics, biochemistry, and fluid dynamics in exactly the same way is either 
mistaken or too coarse. Our definition occupies the right middle ground: it is general 
enough to cover a large array of cases and yet it allows us to say what is specific 
about them.  
 
Third, DEKI meets our conditions of adequacy from Section 1. DEKI allows for 
misrepresentation in at least two places. A representation is accurate if T indeed 
posses the properties that M ascribes imputes to it. This need not be the case; in fact 
that T possesses any of the imputed properties is not built into the notion of 
representation-as. M can represent T as possessing properties Q1, ...,Qm and T might 
not instantiate a single of them.17 If M represents T as having properties that it doesn’t 
have it misrepresents it. The other place were misrepresentation can enter is 
denotation. Denotation can fail in various ways – a representation can purportedly 
denote a target that does not exist or it can denote the wrong target. The surrogative 
reasoning condition requires that models represent their targets in a way that allows 
scientist to generate hypotheses about them. This requirement is satisfied by condition 
																																																								
17 It ought to be noted also that accuracy is orthogonal to the realism issue. Even when models have all 
kind of unobservable properties, they can be interpreted as exemplifying only observable properties, or 
only observable properties are keyed up. Such interpretations are antirealist.  
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(iv), which requires that at least one property be imputed to T. This imputation 
generates a hypothesis about T that can then be tested.  
 
Finally, it is worth pointing out that the ordering of the conditions is not supposed to 
introduce a temporal element into either scientific representation or the process of 
constructing the model; nor is it meant to indicate logical priorities. None of the 
conditions has to be established prior to the others, and the model could exemplify the 
properties even before being used to represent a target by the model user. The user 
could equally well start off with the target system and a set of properties of interest. 
She could then construct an inverse key associating those properties with ones that we 
have firmer grasp on in the context of model building. She could then construct a 
model that exemplifies those properties, in the appropriate manner under the 
appropriate interpretation, before taking the model and establishing the denotation 
relation between it and the target. Such a process is not ruled out by our conditions. 
DEKI does not function as a diachronic account of scientific representation: as long as 
the conditions are met, in whatever order, a model represents its target system as Z.  
 
 
8. Envoi 
 
Material objects can be turned into scientific models by means of an interpretation. 
This, combined with DEKI, provides an account of how they represent their targets as 
thus or so. Although some scientific models are material objects, others aren’t. This 
raises the question of whether, and if so how, our account of representation can be 
generalised to cover models like the Newtonian model of the solar system, the logistic 
growth model of a population and the Solow model of economic growth. These are, to 
use Hacking’s phrase, ‘things that one holds in one’s head rather than one’s hands’ 
(1983, 216). We submit that the difficulty with these models is ontological not 
semantic. The problem for any account of representation which requires that models 
instantiate properties is that it is remains unclear what that means for non-physical 
objects. Thomson-Jones (2010) points out that such objects, in virtue of their 
abstractness, cannot instantiate the kind of properties one would like to impute to real 
systems. Abstract objects neither have mass; nor do they oscillate.  
 
While this may be a serious problem for a similarity account of representation such as 
Giere’s (1988), DEKI can reply to this in two ways. Firstly, according to our account, 
models don’t strictly speaking need to instantiate physical properties. Rather, they can 
be taken to exemplify properties that apply to abstract objects, which are then keyed 
up with physical ones to be imputed to their target systems. Or alternatively, the 
model can exemplify physical properties, but through I-instantiation rather than 
instantiation proper.18 Secondly, we are hopeful that ‘fictional’ accounts of the 
ontology of models will allow us to reconcile the claim that such models are non-
physical objects with the idea that they can nevertheless be said to instantiate, at least 
in some sense, physical properties in the way that Sherlock Holmes instantiates the 
property of being a pipe smoker, despite the fact he is not a physical being. Frigg 
(2010) and Godfrey-Smith (2006) provide outlines of what such an account could 
look like. Developing the details of such an account and integrating it with the DEKI 
account of representation is a project for future research.  
																																																								
18 Something like this is suggested by Elgin (2010, 8-9). 
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